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Abstract. Applications are increasingly operating on large data sets.
This trend creates problems for access control, which in principle re-
stricts the actions that subjects can perform on any item in that data set.
Performance issues therefore emerge, typically for operations on entire
data sets. Emerging access control models such as attribute-based access
control do meet their limitations in this context. Worse, few solutions
exist that addresses performance problems while supporting separation
of concerns. In this paper, we present a first approach towards address-
ing this challenge. We propose a middleware architecture that performs
policy transformations and query rewriting for externalized policies to
optimize the access control process on the data set. We argue that this
offers a promising approach for reducing the policy evaluation overhead
for access control on large data sets.
Keywords: Access control, policy-based access control, databases, attribute-
based access control
1 Introduction
Applications are increasingly operating on large data sets. This is especially
true for multi-tenant software-as-a-service (SaaS) applications, in which ten-
ant organizations access a shared, typically web-based application hosted by a
provider [12].
Such data must be protected. One important security measure to protect
data is access control, which restricts actions performed by a subject (e.g., user)
on an object (e.g., resource). A typical approach to realize this is to externalize
an access control policy from the application and evaluate it each time a subject
performs a request to the application [20, 22], a technique commonly referred to
as Policy-Based Access Control (PBAC). This supports separation of concerns [7]
and enables tenants in multi-tenant SaaS applications to specify their own policy
without service interruption [8].
One challenge for policy-based access control is to enforce it for operations
on a large data set. An operation comprises of the same action that is performed
on each element of the data set. For example, when subjects perform a search
on a database, only the elements (or objects) to which they are entitled should
be returned. This involves a policy evaluation for the view action on the objects.
A naive approach to such issue is to serially evaluate the access control policy
for each data item returned by the search query and filter the results. However,
this can involve considerable evaluation overhead [21], especially for policies
specified according to emerging access control models such as attribute-based
access control [11]. On the other hand, while most database management systems
support some form of efficient access control enforcement, they do not provide
a solution to this problem that both scales in terms of the number of users and
organizations, and meanwhile provides separation of concerns.
In this paper, we approach this issue by merging policy transformation and
query rewriting techniques to optimize operations on large data sets. These tech-
niques should be employable in a manner that is transparent to the application
developer, thereby accomplishing a separation of concerns. This paper provides
a first analysis of the approach that combines these techniques for this purpose,
and discusses challenges that need to be addressed to realize such an approach.
Organization. Section 2 provides a scenario and motivates the requirements.
This section also elaborates on related work. Section 3 describes the middleware
that we propose to mitigate the problem. Section 4 discusses the proposed solu-
tion further, and elaborates on the challenges. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Motivation
This paper describes how policy transformation and query rewriting techniques
can be combined to enforce access control policies for operations on large data
sets. Although several such operations can be performed, such as batch insertions
or updates, our main focus will be to enforce this for search operations.
Fig. 1. The document management application enables tenants to specify policies.
To illustrate this issue, consider a document management SaaS application,
that manages millions of business documents for multiple tenants, as shown
in Figure 1. These tenants can each specify their own policies to restrict their
respective affiliates. For example, they could permit read access to the creator of
a document, and to all members of his/her department (e.g., accounting). The
affiliates should also be restricted access based on policies that were specified
by the application developers. In general, for example, such an affiliate cannot
access documents of another tenant. A tenant can not be restricted access to its
own documents through policies of another tenant [8].
When affiliates of a tenant search for documents in the document manage-
ment application, they must only be returned the documents they are entitled to.
This involves enforcement of application policies (e.g., subjects can only access
documents of their tenant) and tenant policies (e.g., subjects of the accounting
department can view paychecks).
2.1 Requirements
Besides functional requirements previously indicated in the scenario, the solution
must support several additional characteristics:
Transparency. The middleware must integrate seamlessly with the existing
application, and respect the principle of separation of concerns. More partic-
ularly, the application developer should not take into account access control
when writing queries.
Support for application-level policies. The middleware must take into ac-
count policies that reason about application concepts. An access control
policy is safe if it only refers to concepts that exist in the application or,
alternatively, refers to the subject that performs actions on the application.
Similarly, a query is safe if it corresponds to the underlying database schema.
Support for tenant policies. The middleware must take into account policies
specified by tenants. Since tenants provide untrusted input in the policies,
we must ensure that they are secure, i.e., that they do not escalate privileges
over provider policies, nor are they vulnerable to injection attacks.
Support for expressive policies. The middleware should support expressive
policies. This enables tenants to specify fine-grained access constraints.
Performance. The middleware should reduce the access control evaluation
overhead for operations on large data sets. The overhead that is introduced
by the middleware itself must be minimized.
2.2 Related work
A lot of related work has been performed in the domain of database access
control. Many traditional database management systems employ views, stored
procedures and access control lists to restrict access for individual subjects [3].
However, many such techniques assume a two-tier architecture, which has no
use when the application performs a query on behalf of a subject, as is the case
in multi-tier architectures that are common today [19]. As a result, such access
control techniques cannot be effectively enforced at the database at a granularity
level that exceeds the application. This is also the case for many techniques that
employ query rewriting to optimize access control [5, 10, 15, 18].
One technique that mitigates this issue is Virtual Private Database (VPD, [1]).
VPD supports application identification, as a complement to subject identifica-
tion, to enforce access control policies that are specified in the DBMS. While this
supports the specification of views and queries that are aware of individual sub-
jects, VPD requires policies to be specified at the database management system.
This does not adhere to the principle of separation of concerns. Moreover, it re-
quires the policies to restrict in terms of database operations (e.g., insertion and
selection), whereas application actions may involve multiple such operations.
Opyrchal et al. [16] have addressed a similar issue to our goal by enforcing
CPOL policies for databases. Their system first checks whether a query is per-
mitted and evaluates the policy for each returned element if it is. However, their
method involves only limited query rewriting and no policy transformations.
Consequently, the system does not scale when large data sets are involved, espe-
cially if many elements are returned. By performing query rewriting and policy
transformation, our approach is able to reduce data sets on which access control
is performed, and optimizes access control evaluation for the remaining sets.
Axiomatics data access filter [2] also provides a solution that enforces policy-
based access control on databases for attribute-based policies. However, it does
not provide sufficient constraints to ensure safe and secure queries in the light
of, among others, multi-tenant applications.
Cook et al. [6] focus on the safety of composing queries. They propose a
method that effectively restricts developers from specifying queries that do not
correspond to the application domain. This is complementary to our work, but
it does not focus on the middleware that performs safe query rewriting.
This work relates to that of access control and usage control enforcement
techniques. Notably, in [17], Pretschner et al. present an architecture that is
capable of enforcing usage control policies in a distributed fashion. A similar
approach is taken in [9] to ensure access control enforcement is decentralized.
While this relates to our objective to speed up enforcement for access control,
our approach does not perform distributed evaluation to achieve this.
3 Approach
In order to meet the requirements that were introduced in Section 2, we propose
a middleware that transparently performs access control for operations on large
data sets. This section outlines the middleware architecture. The next section
discusses the challenges and motivates its feasibility.
The middleware is embedded in a database abstraction layer, and intercepts
every query that is performed on the database. The database abstraction layer
provides an abstraction over data access and integrates technologies such as
JDBC1 or object-relational mappers (ORM) such as JPA2 to hide database-
specific complexity. The middleware intercepts the query and determines the
objects on which the operation can be performed before executing it on them.
In order to support expressive policies, the middleware supports a XACML-
like policy language. XACML [14] provides a tree-structured, attribute-based
policy language in which policies can themselves contain other policies, thus
1 Java Database Connectivity, see also http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/
overview-141217.html.
2 Java Persistence API, see also http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javaee/
tech/persistence-jsp-140049.html.
forming a policy tree. Applicability of both policies and rules are determined
during the evaluation, in which a target expression indicates applicability for
a policy, and a condition expression indicates applicability for a rule. If a rule
is applicable, its corresponding decision (i.e., permit or deny) is taken into ac-
count. Expressions compare attributes assigned to subjects, objects, actions and
environment with each other and concrete values in order to determine the appli-
cability. Combining algorithms (e.g., first applicable, permit overrides) provide
conflict resolution when multiple policies or rules are applicable.
3.1 Design
The middleware combines policy transformation and query rewriting techniques
to optimize access control evaluation for large data sets. Figure 2 outlines the
architecture. The access control middleware introduces two components: the
policy transformer and the query translator.
Fig. 2. The middleware employs policy transformations and query rewriting to reduce
evaluation overhead for access control.
The policy transformer is responsible for retrieving, validating and trans-
forming the policy. This results in a transformation of the original policy to a
reduced form with the same semantics. The component achieves three goals.
First, it substitutes all attributes that are not assigned to the object, and as a
consequence, remain fixed for every element of the query that must be evaluated
against the policy. Second, it prunes the policy by omitting the rules that are
never applicable, thereby reducing evaluation time. Third, it reduces the policy
and its tree structure in such a way that it simplifies the translation to a query.
The query translator takes as input the transformed policy, and translates it
to a query that can be executed on the database. In order to support a wide range
of underlying database systems, we do not require the policy to be incorporated
in the resulting query entirely. Rather, the translator may select and translate a
partial policy that can significantly reduce the data set on which the transformed
policy must be evaluated. This enables the middleware to be used for database
systems that have a constrained query language, which is common especially
among NoSQL systems. Moreover, it supports translation to only queries that
can be performed without significant overhead.
Figure 2 illustrates how the middleware handles the access control process.
The access control process for search operations consists of six steps:
1. Policy retrieval and validation. The policy transformer retrieves and
combines all policies that are relevant for the acting subject. Next, it vali-
dates that the concepts that are referred to in the policy apply to the applica-
tion. This is especially a problem when attribute-based policies are involved,
because attribute-based policies require an understanding of the properties
associated with the subjects, objects, and actions of the application domain.
Validation ensures that no errors can occur in the evaluation in this regard.
Moreover, it can ensure that queries that are rewritten are safe (i.e., they re-
fer only to application concepts) and secure (i.e., they do not lead to privilege
escalation) because they are translated from a sanitized set of expressions.
2. Policy rewriting. The policy transformer retrieves all relevant attributes
of the acting subject, action and environment. This information is leveraged
to prune the policy to contain only relevant rules. This stems from the ob-
servation that for each object, the subject and action will remain the same
and may lead to rules that are always (in)applicable for the search operation.
Such rules enable pruning of the policy. To do this, the middleware substi-
tutes the attributes with concrete values and determines which rules and
policies can be pruned. This can reduce policy evaluation time and reduce
the query that is generated based on the access control policy later in the
process. For instance, consider that an accountant searches all documents
in the document management platform that match a certain search term. If
the policy also includes rules that target other roles or actions, they can be
pruned for the transformation.
3. Policy to query translation. In this step, the transformed policy is trans-
lated to a query. Note that the query should evaluate only concepts of the
objects on which the search operation is performed, due to the substitution
of attributes in the previous step. The query translator could select only a
partial policy to translate to due to functional or performance constraints
of the underlying database. Such a query must significantly reduce the size
of the data set to optimize the access control evaluation process. For in-
stance, consider again the example scenario of the previous step. Consider
also that the policy states that accountants can only read financial docu-
ments that were created in the last year. The query translation could select
only a part of this rule, e.g., that only financial documents may be read,
to cope with constraints of the query language of the underlying database.
This could already significantly reduce the resulting data set on which serial
policy evaluation must be performed, because other types of documents for
which the policy would evaluate to a deny decision are already filtered out.
4. Query. The query translator composes a query that takes into account both
the original request parameters (e.g., search parameters) and the access con-
trol policy (translated in the previous step). Next, it retrieves all objects
that satisfy the composed query from the underlying database.
5. Policy evaluation. The policy transformer evaluates the previously trans-
formed policy for each object that resulted from the query. This determines
on which objects the subject is entitled to perform the search operation. For
instance, consider the translation of a partial policy in the example of the
third step. The previously transformed policy can be evaluated against the
result set to enforce that the documents were created in the last year. Note
that this step is redundant when the policy is fully translated to the query,
and can be skipped in such a case.
6. Result. Finally, the resulting data set is returned to the subject.
4 Discussion
With the architecture presented in Section 3, we intend to significantly reduce
the policy evaluation overhead for operations on large data sets. However, in
order to do this, several challenges need to be addressed.
The middleware optimizes access control for large data sets through policy
transformation and query rewriting. Both can introduce an overhead. On the one
hand, policy transformation may introduce a processing overhead, and still re-
quires considerable overhead when the transformed policy is evaluated against a
large data set. On the other hand, performing a query that was rewritten accord-
ing to a policy may also introduce an overhead when applied to a large data set.
Consequently, a balance must be found in determining to what extent the query
is rewritten. This is complicated by the variability of the underlying database
schema and the query languages that are supported by the database system.
This is a considerable challenge for future work, especially when NoSQL sys-
tems must be supported. In general, these systems are identified by constraints
in their query language and a potentially large cost for performing certain types
of queries. Whenever a policy is only translated partially into a query, this re-
quires an evaluation of the transformed policy over the objects in the data set
that results from this query. This is performed in the fifth step of the process.
Because some of the expressions of the policy are already included as part of
the query, the policy could be further transformed to omit these expressions and
hence avoid redundant evaluation. When the policy can be translated fully into
a query, this post-evaluation step can be omitted altogether.
While we focused on constraining search operations, a similar approach could
be performed for write operations (e.g., batch updates). This would involve a
step that filters out objects for which the operation is not permitted prior to
performing the query, if the policy can not be translated fully to a query.
The strategy introduced in this paper requires that both database and mid-
dleware preside in the same security domain. Else, the solution would be subject
to data leaking for objects that were not filtered by the query, but are withheld
by the policy evaluation.
In order to determine the feasibility of the approach presented in this paper,
we have induced a prototype that is capable of handling policy transformations
for the STAPL [13] policy language (which closely resembles XACML [14]) and
performs query rewriting for SQL-compliant database systems. To ensure the
safety and security of the queries that are generated in our approach, validation
techniques can be employed. Safety validation can be performed through match-
ing the referred attributes to the application domain concepts [4]. This is done
through a separate artifact that describes the properties of the subjects, objects
and actions associated with the application domain and how they map on the
database schema. This artifact can be extracted automatically from the appli-
cation code. Security validation intends to prevent privilege escalation through
queries generated from custom policies, and can also employ this artifact in
combination with whitelisting techniques for the expressions of the policy to
determine whether they can be translated to a query securely. The initial proto-
type indicates the feasibility of the approach, and a thorough evaluation of the
performance will be presented in future work.
5 Conclusion
This paper has presented an initial step towards a middleware than can transpar-
ently enforce access control for search operations on large data sets. Evidently,
many challenges remain. These include the way that the middleware handles
variability of the underlying database schema and analyzing the performance
issues that large policies may introduce on the translated query. However, we
believe that such problems can be mitigated.
We are convinced that the middleware presented in this paper can signifi-
cantly reduce the overhead introduced by performing access control for large data
sets, and should be further researched in future work. This would enable policy-
based access control to be enforced on both the application and the database,
effectively supporting a separation of concerns.
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